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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RELIABLE FURNITURE aJMPANY 
' 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO., 
WESTERN GEl\'ERAL AGENCY, and 
GENERAL A DJllSTMENT BUREAU, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 











RELIEF SOUGHT BY FOR REHEARING 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision 
and findings of the Court of Utah in 
the instant action by reason of the Judgment 
<)ranted by the Court on 10, 1970, 
whC'rein it affirmed the Judgment of the lower 
C<>u rt. Appell ant seeks to have the Supreme 
_)urt remand the case bar:k to the lower Court, 
5 
so that Appellant may have a jury weigh the 
facts and determine the issues set forth by 
the oleading of the Appellant and Respondents 
and do justice to the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Anpellant refers the Honorable Court to 
both the Appellant's original Brief and 
Appellant's reply Brief in the matter herein 
as to the facts in this action, but would draw 
to the attention of the Court an error in the 
written decision of the Court, wherein in the 
third oaragraph of the Court's March 10, 1970, 
statement of the case, it alleges that a fire 
occurred on March 30, 1961, ''* * * and six 
weeks later on June 16, 1961." It is pointed 
out to this Honorable Court that March 30, 
1961, to June 16, 1961, is a period of approxi-
mately 79 days. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER 
6 
OOURT JU£X1.1ENT RULING THERE WAS AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
Accord and Satisfaction is an affirmative 
defense, but must be pleaded, as set forth 
in the reply Brief of the Appellant on Page 2. 
The Court in its March 10, 1970, decision in 
the instant action, referred to Bennet vs. 
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, 18 Ut.2d 186, 417 P.2d 761, 
August, 1966, as authority for its statement, 
"Where a person (the Plaintiff) has in writing 
accepted a settlement of a disputed claim, the 
effect is an llccord and This 
is a case wherein the employee was the Plaintiff 
and sought recovery of commissions from the 
Defendant who was the employer. The Defendant-
employer gave the Plaintiff-employee a check 
with a notation, payment in full thereon, and 
the Plaintiff cashed the check taking the pro-
ceeds and subsequently filed an action for 
additional monies coming to him and the Defen-
dant sought to defend on the grounds of an Accord 
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and Satisfaction. In this case, the employee 
cashing the check with a notation that payment 
was in full was held by the Court as not con-
stituting an Accord and Satisfaction as held 
by the Utah Supreme Court. This case is direct 
authority for the Reliable facts that there 
was no accord. 
This Honorable Court held in the Scoville 
vs. Kellogg Sales Company case, 261 P.2d 933, 
October 16, 1953, which was a case wherein a 
salesman had funds coming and was paid by a 
check, which he endorsed and cashed without 
formal protest and subsequently filed an action 
against the employer for additional monies 
allegedly due and owing. Ille defense of the 
emoloyer was an Accord and Satisfaction and the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that this defense was 
one for a jury to decide. See also Ralph A. 
Badger & Company vs. Fidelity Building & Loan 
Association, 94 Ut. 97, 75 P.2d 669; A. W. Sewell 
Company vs. Commercial casualty & Insurance 
8 
Company, 80 Ut. 378, 15 P.2d 327. 
Louis W. Trompeter vs. United Insurance 
Company, Supreme Court of Washington, October 
17, 1957, 316 P.2d 455, held, that in a personal 
injury case where a sum was paid by an Insurer 
for loss of time and med:i cal expense due under 
the terms of the policy and was a liquidated 
sum, that there was no consideration for the 
release of the Insurer's liability to the In-
sured. That under the facts, existing therein, 
there had not been payment for all of his injury 
and that, therefore, the consideration was in-
sufficient and there could not be an Accord 
and Satisfaction or Release in the matter. 
This Honorable Court held in Kelley vs. 
Salt Lake Transportation Company, August 15, 
1941, 116 P.2d 383, that where consideration is 
grossly inadequate as to a Release, that the 
very inadequacy of the amount may clearly indi-
cate fraud therein. 
This Court in its last instant decision, 
stated, quoting from Jiminez vs. O'Brien, 
9 
117 Ut. 82, 213 P.2d 337, "The avoidance (of 
an Accordance and requires clear 
and convincing evidence." However, this Court 
in a later statement, in Kirchgestner vs. 
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company, 
233 P.2d 699, June 19, 1951, in defining "clear 
and convincing" stated that "we had occasion 
recently to examine the expression 'clear and 
convincing evidence' and the Court defined it 
as evidence that must at least have reached a 
where there remains no serious doubt or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion." Assuming that the Court should 
ignore all of the other conditions which have 
been set forth as necessary, to have a pleading 
of Accord and Satisfaction in the action herein, 
and assuming that all of the other elements 
hPreinabove set forth have been met, it must 
be obvious from the three day testimony of 
Plaintiff's witnesses, that the evidence being 
viewed as this Court has said, "in the light 
' 
10 
most favorable to the Plaintiff's contentions" 
that an Accord and Satisfactjon cannot lie ' 
and that there is sufficient evidence in the 
testimor.y in the record, in avoidance of such 
an Accord and Satisfaction. 
This Court stated in Reliable F\Jrni ture 
Company vs. Fidelity at 16 Ut. 2d 211, 398 
P.2d 685, February 3, 1965, "uoon the basis of 
the record thus far, it appears that Defendants 
own figures showed that it owes the Plaintiff 
$12,609.39." As evidenced by the record in 
the instant case before this Court, this figure 
shows that the amount owing to the Plaintiff 
is in a sum of approximately $128,000.00. 
Casper National Bank vs. Woodin, et al., 
Supreme Court of Wyoming, June 19, 1951, 232 
P.2d 706, the Court stated, that where a debtor 
already does what it is already bound to do, 
that there is no to support an 
Accord and Satisfaction. As this Court, the 
1'tah Court, has said the $12,000.00 
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9iven to the Appellant, was a minimal consider-
ation and in light of the testimony now on 
record and before this Court, was not even an 
aporoxi ma ti on of the amount truly due. 
It was stated in Siegal vs. A. L. Lechler, 
Supreme Court of Colorado, November 1, 1954, 
275 P.2d 949, that a release given for a nominal 
consideration is not supported by any valid 
legal consideration and that it is void and 
does not bar a right of action by the Plaintiff 
for the full amount actually owing to the party. 
Moore vs. Satir, Supreme Court of California 1 
July 11 z 19491 207 P.2d 835, the Court set forth 
what the elements of an Accord are: 
1. A proper subject matter. 
2. Competent ;Jarties. 
3, Consent or meeting of the minds of the 
na r ti es. 
4. Consideration. 
As has been areviously set forth for this 
r,1urt, there is an entire lack of two of the 
12 
elements herein; which would be the consent 
or meeting of the minds of the oarties, and 
the consideration herein; and further, the 
California Court held that whether or not there 
was an was a question of fact, the 
intention of the parties, and hence, a jury 
question and not one for the lower Court to 
have taken away from the jury in giving its 
decision. 
POirff I I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FRAUD AS A 
MATTER OF U\W. 
The Court in its decision of March 10, 
1970, precipitously dismissed fraud as a factor, 
stating some of the elements of fraud were 
missing herein. It is the contention of the 
Anpellant that deceit is a basic element of 
fraud and can constitute fraud. As set forth 
1n M. G. Chamberlain and Comnany vs. Kenneth R. 
District Court of Appeal of California, 
j\-'2_9ust 25, 1959, at 343 P.2d 438, ''deceit is 
1.1 
either the suggestion as a fact, of that which 
is not true, by one who does not believe it 
to be true, or the suppression of a fact by 
one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives 
information of other facts, which are likely 
to mislead for want of communication of that 
fact." The evidence this Court is clear 
that William Ball as agent of the General Adjust-
ment Bureau and Jack Day as agent for the other 
in this action, had a duty to disclose 
to the Plaintiff, that the $84,000.00 check for 
the inventory was deliverable to the Plaintiff 
without any strings whatsoever attached to it, 
and that his failure to so act and his insis-
tence as the unimpeached testimony of the 
Plaintiff's witnesses, Sam Herscovitz and Wayne 
clearly evidences, that not only was 
there no revelation of an unincumbered delivery 
of the check for the inventory, but to the con-
trary, that conditions were attached to its 
delivery, namelv, the accertance of the $12,000.00 
14 
draft as settlement for American Home Assurance. 
The California Court in the Chamberlain case 
went further and stated "Where a release is 
orocured through fraud and conspiracy, it is 
immaterial whether the fraud was practiced by 
an authorized or a self-constituted agent of 
the Releasee. In either event, the Releasee 
should not be allowed to take advantage of an 
unfair settlement obtained through the fraud 
of a third party, for his benefit. Even persons 
who are not parties to procuring of a release 
cannot defend its validity against arocurement 
by fraud." 
D:>binson vs. McD:>nald, 92 California 33, 
27 P. 1098; Chung vs. Johnston, 128 California 
App. 2d 157, 274 P.2d 922, set forth the prin-
ciple, that the failure to disclose material 
facts affecting the essence of a release agree-
ment may constitute actual fraud vitiating the 
contract. 
Winstanley vs. Ackerman, 110 Cal. App. 641, 
15 
294 P. 449, stated that where it is shown that 
deception has been practiced in obtaining a 
release, it may not be considered as a satis-
faction of anything not consented to by the 
Claimant. 
Jordan vs. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d. 469, 144 
P.2d 349, sets forth the principle that in any 
case, where fraud or release is alleged, it 
is for the Trier of Facts to determine whether 
one of the oarties had an understanding of the 
effect of the writing, which was different from 
that expressed in the writing, and whether his 
different understanding was induced by the 
other party. 
This Court in its Reliable decision of 
February 1965 stated that "upon consideration 
of the record as it has come to us, we cannot 
conclude with such certainty as to justify 
ruling as a matter of law, that there was no 
duress and/or fraud practiced upon the Plaintiff 
tn obtaining the release in question." 
16 
It should be stated that the unimoeached 
testimony set forth in the record here, and 
stating the testimony of Wayne Dykstra and 
Sam Herscovitz, clearly being considered in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and 
being unimpeached, is even a stronger record 
than was evidenced by the Depositions and 
Pleadings before the Court at the time it made 
this state:nent. 
It was stated in Francis McKinley Samora 
vs. Lorenzo Bradford, January 2, 1970, the 
Court of Appeals of New Mexico, 465 P.2d 88, 
"uncontradicted evidence, which is not subject 
to reasonable doubts, may not be arbitrarily 
disregarded." This was also adopted in the 
cases of Aragon vs. Boyd, 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d 
614, 1969; Medler vs. Henry, 44 N.M. 275, 101 
P.2d 398, 1940. Testimony need not be accepted 
as true when not directly contradicted, if: 
1. The witnesses are shown to be unworthy 
of belief, or 
17 
2. His testimony is equivocal or contains 
inherent improbabilities, or 
3. Shows a transaction surrounded by sus-
picious circumstances, or 
4. Is contradicted, subject to reasonable 
doubt as to truth and veracity, by legitimate 
inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances 
of the case. 
This principle being set forth in Hales vs. 
VanCleave, 78 N.M. 181, 429 P.2d 379, stated, 
credibility is a matter for the Jury and not 
f0r the Court in a Summary Judgment or Dismissal. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE [X)CTRINE OF 
STARE DECISIS. 
The doctrine of stare decisis js described 
in Floyd vs. Department of Labor and Industries, 
Supreme Court of Washington, April 9, 1954, 
69 P. 2d 563, "The rule laid down in any parti-
cular case is applicable only to the facts in 
that particular case or to another case involv-
in·_i identical or substantially similar facts." 
As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, fourth 
f'dition, Page 157, stare decisis is binding 
on the Court only "in subsequent cases where 
the very 3oint is again in controversy" and 
where the "facts are substantially the same." 
Chester Barnett vs. M. T. Brown and C. V. 
Hoke, Supreme Court of New Mexico, October 18, 
1956, 302 P.2d 735, the Court stated "the 
are orecisely as those raised and passed 
upon in our decision filed August 15, 1950* * * 
which decision controls disposition of this 
appeal.'' The Court here setting forth the rule 
that where an issue on appeal is the same as 
:Heviously and has been passed upon by a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court that such decision 
the dis?osition of the 
In the Reliable case of February, 1965, the 
facts before the Court were the pleadings, 
[R;>osi tions, and Interrogatories of the parties 
;.ind in the instant :_Hevious Reliable case, 
is no controverting of any of the basic 
19 
facts therein, nor was there any impeachment 
of the facts then set forth before the Court. 
The doctrine of stare decisis would seem to 
apply and be effective in the action before the 
Court. Stocks vs. Stocks, Supreme Court of 
Nevada, July 24, 1947, 183 P.2d 617, the Court 
stated "while Courts will indeed depart from 
the doctrine of stare decisis, where such de-
is necessary to avoid the 'perpetuation 
of error', the observance of the doctrine has 
long been considered indispensable to the due 
of justice, that a question 
once deliberately examined and decided should 
be considered as settled." 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ECONOMIC OORESS 
AS A MATTER 0 F LAW. 
This Honorable Court stated in its 
1965 Reliable dee) sion "In determining whether 
the Plaintiff is entitled to redress, it is 
not essential that his contentions of fraud and 
duress be considered seoarately. They can and 
20 
should be considered on the basis that he con-
tends, that they existed intermingled together; 
and based upon the proper the 
Court correctly assumed that the Plaintiff was 
in economic distress and that the Defendant 
knew and took advantage of this by falsely re-
presenting that money belonging to the Plaintiff 
could not be delivered to him, wrongfully 
refusing to deliver it unless the Plaintiff 
would also accept the proffered settlement 
on Defendant's policy resulting in the Plaintiff 
being compelled to accept a settlement 'against 
his will." The Court made these observations 
in 1965 having before it only the nleadings, 
Depositions, and Briefs of the parties. In the 
March 10, 1970, Reliable decision, the unim-
and sworn to testimony of the Appellants 
witnesses was before the Court, fully setting 
forth every element ?ertaining to duress and 
fraud as appeared in the earlier decision, and 
in addition, a detailed statement of the fraud 
21 
and duress as testified to by the witnesses 
under oath. 
This Honorable Court claimed all of these 
factors of fraud and duress were overcome by 
the fact that Sam Herscovitz was a Law School 
graduate and an intelligent man, with business 
as against the fact that the Defen-
dants' agents were Insurance Agents and Adjustors 
and schooled and trained in the experience of 
giving the least and getting the most, and most 
important, had in their possession property of 
the Plaintiff in the amount of over $84,000.00 
which was desperately needed by the Plaintiff 
if it was to survive. The Defendants had all 
the advantages in the game that was played on 
the premises of the Reliable Furniture on June 19, 
1961. Mr. Herscovitz never denied that he knew 
he was being cheated and being taken advantage 
of by the Defendants, and the fact that he was 
a Law School graduate and that he was intelli-
'lPnt, and that he had business exrerience, might 
22 
have been the basis for his having knowledge 
of the principles of the Law, and perhaps 
having the naivette of a student of the Law, 
in believing that principles of the Law are 
easily, accurately, and always applied to speci-
fie situations, such as the rule laid down by 
this Honorable Court in the Reliable case of 
February 1965 when it held "that where a release 
has been obtained by fraud, the return or tender 
of consideration is not a necessary condition 
rrecedent to disaffirmance of release and en-
forcement of one's claim." 
Metropolitan State Bank, Inc., vs. 
Crox, et al., Supreme Court of Colorado, 
October 8, 1956, 302 P.2d 188, is authority for 
the statement " • • • or one induced by fraud, 
imnosition, over-reaching, or misrepresentation, 
nr by concealment of the material facts, such 
that if it had been known to the other party, 
he would not have entered into the Accord is 
'J'lidahle and ineffective, and as elsewhere ao?ears, 
·d t the i·nstance of the injured 1nay he set as1 e a 
23 
riarty." The Court further stated that an agree-
ment and its performance cannot constitute 
an Accord and Satisfaction of a claim or demand, 
where it is the result of collusion or what is 
known as "business compulsion." 
Wheelock Bros., Inc. 1 vs. Bankers Warehouse 
Company, et al., Supreme Court of Colorado, 
July 1, 1946, 171 ?. 2d 405, is a case analogous 
to the Reliable situation in that the Defendant, 
Bailee, had in his possession merchandise which 
was the property of the Plaintiff, Bailor. 
The Bailee, by reason of its negligent conduct, 
delivered up some of the property of the Bailor 
to a third person and upon the Bailor demanding 
back the remaining inventory in order to pre-
vent any further liquidation of the inventory 
the Bailee refused to release the 
inventory without a full release of any claim 
that the Plaintiff might have, in order to get 
the remaining goods, and upon being given the 
l b h Plal·r,t1"ff--Bailor, did deliver rp ease y t e " 
24 
u::i the remaining inventory. The action herein 
was to invalidate the release and to recover 
the Oefendant, the value of the merchandise 
which it had in its possession and had delivered 
U'J without turning over a de qua te compensation 
to the Bailor for same. The Court quoted Moise 
Bros. Company vs. Jamison, 89 Colorado 278, 
1 P.2d 925, for authority that "such release 
was without consideration and given under duress 
of goods." The Court further stated that the 
Defendant could not allege the release as a 
bar to recovery by the Plaintiff. This Honor-
ab le Court in its February 196 5 decision on 
behalf of Reliable cited Manno vs. Mutual Ben., 
Health and Accident Association, 187 NYS 2d. 
709, also Kelley vs. United Mutual Insurance 
112 S.W. 2d 929, as authority for 
the statement made by this HonoralJle Court when 
it stated "if found to be true, this false re-
-)resentation, coupled with the wrongful with-
' f whi'ch tJelonged to the Plaintiff, •11 1 dj ng o that 
25 
may well justify a finding of duress which 
would afford him release from the settlement." 
The Ct)urt stated in the Reliable March 10, 
.!.22.Q., decision that the signing of the 
$12,000.00 draft nine days later was done after 
all coercion had terminated by reason of the 
cashing of the $84,923.39 draft. The closure 
of Reliables business for 47 days, the non pay-
ment for its inventory of $84,923.39 until more 
than 80 days had elapsed, the inability to 
repair the premises and obtain replacement of 
inventory for six months all were coercive factors. 
The Court is overlooking the most important fact 
of all - the payment of $12,609.00 rather than 
$128,000.00 business interruption loss right-
fully owing the Plaintiff to cover the actual 
exoenditure it made for continuing costs of 
overhead must be considered in its proper relation 
to fraud and economic duress. This was a 
continuing economic factor that was not cured 
tiy the payment of the insurance proceeds. 
26 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING RIGfT OF TRIAL 
BY JURY. 
The Appellant brought to the attention of 
this Honorable Court in its last instant 
Reliable Brief, that this Court has recognized 
in Fimlayson vs. Brady, 121 Ut. 204, 240 P.2d 
49J:, that the right to trial by jury is an 
ancient and valued right, not to be denied 
without compelling reasons. 
In Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 1948, 
the Supreme Court of Utah, 191 P.2d 137, refer-
ring to the constitutional right of trial by 
jury stated that "this Court is charged with a 
duty of protecting all of the rights of all 
litigants. This is especially true of those 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the State and 
Federal Constitutions." The Court further stated 
in this case "that the right to have a jury 
pass upon the issues of fact does not include 
the right to have a cause submitted to a jury 
27 
in the hope of a verdict, when the facts 
undisputably show that the Plaintiff is not 
ent:i tled to release." In the instant case before 
this Honorable Court, we are seeking to de-
termine whether there was duress, fraud, release 
and/or ratification. The determination of any 
one of these is a factual issue, and factual 
issues are for the Jury to determine. This was 
affirmed in the Fimlayson case supra and is 
set forth in 78-21-2 Utah Code Annotated as 
amended 1953; all questions of fact, where a 
trial is by jury, other then those mentioned 
in the next section, are to be decided by the 
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed 
to them, except when otherwise provided. 
Article 1, Section XI, of the Utah Consti-
tution, was cited by this Court in the February 
1965 Reliable decision and was alleged in 
Appellant's Brief on Page 13 and 14 of the 
instant action before this Court. The Supreme 
Cnurt of the State of Utah is circumscribed in 
28 
its power and jurisdiction by the Constitution 
and by the of the State of Utah, and 
it was held in the case of State of Oregon vs. 
Frank B. Reid, June 20, 1956, &ipreme Court 
of Oregon, 298 P.2d 990, "No Court is authorized 
to construe Law to fit each individual case as 
it arises. If it attempted such, the orderly 
administration of justice, according to the 
well established rules adopted to protect the 
public, would cease and chaos would reign." 
53 Am. Jur., Page 292, Section 362, states 
"the trial Court should not assume to direct a 
verdict where its ruling would require it to 
nass upon the credibility of witnesses and weigh 
testimony, or would require it to resolve a 
conflict in the evidence; whenever there is 
credible evidence from which a reasonable con-
clusion can be drawn in support of the claim of 
the narty against whom the Motion is made, the 
must be denied and the case submitted 
tn the jury." It is submitted to this Court 
29 
that three days testimony by the Plaintiff's 
advocates, can only be determined against the 
Plaintiff, by the Court presumptiously taking 
from the jury, the right to determine by 
credibility and demeanor, the value and weight 
0f the testimony given. This particularly so 
when there has been no valid impeachment, 
either from direct or cross examination, of the 
Plaintiff's witnesses, or by direct testimony 
of Defendants' witnesses. 
Article 1, Section VII, of the Constitution 
for the State of Utah provides: "No person 
5hall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." It is submitted 
to this Honorable Court, that what this Court 
stated in its Reliable 1965 decision was in 
at that time and is even more in point, 
now that more then nine years have elapsed from 
the time of the injury of the Plaintiff and 
his pursuit of his constitutional remedies 
when this Court stated "Even more fundamental 
30 
,. 
on this ooint is the reflection upon the 
fact the object is always to do 
justice between the parties." 
CONCUJSION 
WE SUBMIT TO THIS HONORABLE COURT TiiAT 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SO QEAR, THAT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, IT CAN BE HELD TiiAT TiiERE WAS NO DURESS 
AND/OR FRAUD PRACTICED UPON THE PLAINTIFF, AND 
THAT THE DEFEND\NT CANNOf WITH HINDSIGfT REMEDY 
lllE CASE BY INJECTING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, 
WHICH IT DID NOT PLEAD IN THIS ACTION ORIGINALLY. 
IT IS ASKED THAT THIS CASE BE REMANDED FOR 
TRIAL BY A JURY AS PRAYED FOR BY PLAINTIFF. 
Resoectfully submitted, 
PETE N. VLAHOS 
Eccl es Building 
Ogden, Utah 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL of 
Olmstead, Stine and 
2324 Adams Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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